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ON CONSTRUCTING PEOPLE IN SOCIAL INQUIRY1
Klaus Krippendorff
The Annenberg School of Communications
University of Pennsylvania

.. any theory not founded on the nature of being human
is a lie and a betrayal of man. An inhuman theory will
inevitably lead to human consequences -- if the
therapist is consistent. Fortunately, many therapists
have the gift of inconsistency. This, however
endearing, cannot be regarded as ideal.
R.D. Laing, 1967:31

Preliminaries
Communication involves people, not only as participants, as speakers and listeners
for example, but also as observers of and communicators about their participation in
processes of communication. The first is communication in its primary form. The second
is communication about communication, is self-referential, creates, brings about and thus
constitutes the very phenomena that are being talked about while talking. Communication
scholars are in the latter position.
All knowledge, not only about communication, is constructed. What we know
influences if not brings forth what we can observe and what we do observe as a
consequence of informed action influences what we know. This is far from saying that
knowledge is arbitrary and subjective. It emerges in the experience of interacting with our
environment, particularly including other people. Knowledge, when communicated to
others, is subject to reification for we construct our worlds, each for him or herself, not
only from observations alone but also through the vicarious experiences of others and apply
it as if it had been created from our own. Reification means forcing an object of observation
to be what we already know it is.
In society, scientists assume the unquestionable authority to uncover the truth where
ordinary people feel inadequate, uncertain or fail and scientific knowledge is therefore more
readily accepted and applied than common sense. Of course people can object to or
deliberately deviate from a theory concerning them, whether they judge it wrong, unfair or
not in their best interest. Feminist criticism of theories of human behavior largely proposed
by and for men is such a response to theory and may invalidate it by the refusal to conform.
But ordinary people tend to submit to scientific authority. Educators, public relations
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experts, therapists, managers and politicians who practice what they have learned in college
and through scientific literature cau not quite help but to cast people into what they know
they should be, and being people themselves, may conform to their own vicariously
acquired knowledge as well. Unable to stand up against scientific authority in this grant
self-fulfilling cycle, people may increasingly become what scientist claim they are. (We
know of experiments with teachers who are told their class is stupid and students indeed
become that way, of men who are convinced women are irrational and after some time this
is what their wives end up being, or of psychoanalysts who unknowningly teach their
patients to conform to a psychopathology they are convinced they can treat successfully.
These are obvious examples, often denigrated to self-fulfilling prophesies [Watzlawick,
1984], but I believe the reification of knowledge goes much deeper.)
It is the reflexive nature of social inquiry, unrecognized or paradigmatically ruled out
in naturalist observation techniques, not evil intentions, that can entrap individuals into roles
without the awareness that these roles were acquired. As Heisenberg taught us, data that
confirm a particular theory do not attest to its "truth" independent of the process of
confirmation. Confirmation could be an artifact of the analytical techniques chosen in
conjunction with the theory, unable to compute anything other than the hypothesized
evidence. But more importantly, confirmation could be a consequence of surreptitious
influences conveyed during scientific experiments, coersive forces inherent in the social
situation that embraces the observed behavior, or subjects' knowledge of what the theory
predicts. The reasons for data to be confirming are difficult to entangle in practice and
perhaps therefore ignored in naive naturalist claims that something was "found to be the
case."
However, whenever such "findings" reenter the very social fabric from where they
stem, whether in the form of theory derived performance standards, intervention strategies,
educational practices and public discussions with collective pressures towards consensus,
the self-fulfilling cycle becomes complete and self-supporting. Particularly when such
reentering knowledge carries the authority of "scientific objectivity" is it likely to not only
make a theory of how people communicate with one another acceptable, but also render the
implied social roles consistent with that theory, lend credence and stability to the social
fabric in which it occurs and legitimize the methodology employed to yield such findings.
Such self-fulfilling cycles cau reproduce over and over again particular relationships

between observers and observed, between theory creating social scientists and other human
beings.
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Realizing the creative potential inherent in the awareness that knowledge is
constructed interactively, I recently proposed five ethical imperatives for social inquiry
(Krippendorff, in press), the last and social imperative of which demands that the
communication of scientific findings expand the range of possibilities rather than narrow it
or· be emancipatory rather than constraining. [This imperative is a close relative of von
Foerster's: "act always so as to increase the number of choices. "(1981)]. I want to live up
to this imperative and explore how we as social scientists of different schools construct the
people we inquire about, the methods that bring such constructions about and the social
purposes served thereby. This aim might be considered political in the domain of theory.
The starting point of this effort is the existentialist distinction between two kinds of
world constructions: one in which people see themselves surrounded by tangible objects
they need to manipulate to achieve their own ends and one in which people see themselves
related to other fellow human beings, much like themselves, with whom they appreciate
being for no apparent purpose. Buber (1970; Horwitz, 1978) called these the I-it and I-thou
relationship respectively. At least one recent study generated convincing data concerning the
reality of this distinction (Roberts, 1985). To elucidate the construction of people in social
inquiry, Buber's distinction had to be expanded to four kinds of I-other relationships (in
which the I here is the inquiring scientist) through which the logical entailments,
connections to existing methodologies and the social implications of these constructions are
explored.

I-it: Trivial Machines
A trivial machine responds to its input:

i--0-Y
The aim of analyzing something as a trivial machine is to render its behavior (the
output, y) predictable from the conditions that impinge upon it (the input, i). This is
accomplished by establishing a relation between the two observables, ideally in the form of
a mathematical function, y=F(i).
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The ideal of a function fully explains the behavior of trivial machines except for the
input which is left open, to be determined from the ontside, by its user, for example .
Variation that might enter a trivial machine surrepticiously is unaccountable within the
framework of this construction and considered either as noise (unexplainable random errors)
or as a breakdown (unanticipated changes in function) but never in terms of choices made
within a machine.
As von Foerster (1984) points out, trivial machines are analytically determinable in
the sense that their input-output relations are believed to be deducible from observations.
Indeed, most analytical (computational) techniques in social research, whether applied to
data about people or about things, tend to yield findings that describe trivial machines:
correlation coefficients indicate the degree to which input-output relations are non-random
and linear, regression equations spell out the contributions multiple predictor variables make
to a criterion, and Shannon's information rates assess the degree to which a sender (the
experimenter) can control a receiver's (the subject's) behavior. Trivial machines permeate a
great many discourses. Consider the follow correspondences:
input
stimulus
text
question
independent variable
cause
minor premise

function
organism
reader
student
correlation
Jaw of nature
major premise

output
response
interpretation
answer
dependent variable
consequence
conclusion

The pervasiveness of this construction is apparent.
We like trivial machines for their reliability. When we turn the wheel of a car, we
want to be sure the car turns as intended. When we mail a letter, we want to be sure the
mail person delivers it at the right address; and when we order a meal in a restaurant, we
want to be sure the waiter serves us what we ordered. Evidently, people can be made to
behave as trivial machines, whether in the military, on an assembly line, as simultaneous
interpreters or as drivers of a car, but also during the course of a psychological experiment.
What I presume we like most about trivial machines and what motivates us to force people
into these terms is that they then no longer have aspirations for making choices of their own.
If they would, we could no longer be able to maintain the illusion of being the ultimate ruler
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of our own tangible universe. When describing people in these terms, the freedom that
might reside within them is surrendered to their users, including to the scientific observers
or experimenters who start out with this assumption, manipulate "independent variables"
and proceed to show how their behavior depends on it..

I-they:

Non-trivial Machines

A non-trivial machine responds not only to inputs but also to its variable internal states.
The simplest case is this:

F 1-----11----y
z

G

where inputs i, outputs y and internal states z are related by:
y <== F(i,z) as the driving function and
z <== G(i,z) as the (internal) state function.
Four properties are worth noting here: first, the internal states affect themselves and
this self-reference is depicted by the recursive loop involving z. Non-trivial machines
therefore have at least in part a life of their own. Second, while the internal states can be
interpreted as a kind of repository of the machine's history, since they cannot be observed
by definition, the way non-trivial machines represent their history escapes direct
observation. Third, a non-trivial machine's behavior can be explained neither from its
inputs nor from its internal states alone but from the interaction between the two. Nontrivial machines are therefore unpredictable from the outside. Yet, fourth, one can build
non-trivial machines from entirely deterministic components.
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Noting that non-trivial machines are somewhat disobedient or obedient also to an
"inner voice," von Foerster characterized the relation between inputs and outputs as history

dependent and analytically indeterminable. The key to this indeterminacy lies in the selfreferential loop involving the internal states z through which non-trivial machines join their
"famous sisters" Godel's Incompleteness Theorem, Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle,
and Gill's Interdeterminacy Principle. However, because non-trivial machines certainly can
be constructed, they are appropriately called synthetically determinable (Foerster, 1984: 13).
Compared with simple input-output devices, one might be inclined to see certain
human qualities in non-trivial machines. Consciousness certainly is recursive. History
surely is important in people's lives. Human cognition is complex and unobservable from
the outside. There is interaction between sensation, memory and action and much of what
people do is generative, not merely responsive. To overcome the inherent analytical
indeterminacy of people, social scientists have seized on the synthetic determinability of
non-trivial machines, using at least three strategies as guides to their construction.
The first, appealing but largely a failure, is to explain human behavior in terms of an
underlying neurophysiology. The proposal is reasonable except for the transcomputational
complexity of the internal state function, involving the 10 billion neurons in the human
brain, and the physical impossibility of observing them without massive destruction.
(Incidentally, studies of Einstein and Lenin's brains have produced nothing extraordinary).
Extending this strategy to social phenomena makes the task even more unwieldy.
The second strategy is to collect data on at least two levels, environmental conditions
and behaviors of people on one, and verbal accounts of their perceptions, experiences, and
decisions on the other. The latter serves to construct the internal mechanism with which the
former is to be explained. A good example is found in attitude research, cognitive
dissonance theory in particular. Indeed, a great deal can be learned from the reports by
people about how they come to like or dislike other people, things they are associated with
and the psycho-logic that emerges from such inquiries does help to explain actual behavior.
But, as most therapists know, people rarely are aware of all that matters in their lives and
this insight often serves as a justification to distrust the picture people paint about
themselves.
The third strategy then is to invent a hypothetical mechanism that aims to bridge the
unobservable gap between inputs and behaviors. When successful, these mechanisms can
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be interpreted as models of the unobservable structures and may achieve predictability
without the claim of structural correspondence. In most cases these inventions are
projections of what scientific observers are conscious of about themselves onto the people
they observe and wish to understand. A good example is the study of grammar. It is
undertaken by linguists who tend to be fluent in the language they wish to describe and have
been trained in the history of such descriptions. Since ordinary speakers of a language
rarely are aware of how they construct sentences, empirical tests of a grammar concern their
generative ability.
Two consequences derive from using predictability as a criterion for accepting
synthetically determinable non-trivial machines as models of human behavior. The first is
that they too deny the existence offreedom people might experience. For example, the
construction of values, conceived of as an individual's stable predispositions and as
governors of the rational choices people make, renders decision making merely a matter of
computation. Freud's system of explaining human behavior in terms of drives depicts
people's consciousness as the product of historical forces not under their control. Once the
mechanism of intelligence is operationalized (as is the aim of artificial intelligence efforts)
the choices that someone experiences become pseudo-choices and freedom a merely
subjective or fictional phenomenon arising out of the ignorance of presumed structional
determinacy.
The second is that non-trivial machines are constructed from the outside. In this
conception, people can neither know all details of their own construction nor are they able to
predict their own behavior. An attempt to affinnatively claim this ability results in a paradox
that conventional logic conveniently resolves by reference to an outside creator. Even
ethnomethodologists who try to be fair to their informants' self-knowledge cannot escape
this outsider status. An extreme example is the Western ideal of logical reasoning and
rational behavior which serves as a standard against which people of all kinds tend to be
judged illogical or irrational respectively even though they merely follow a logic of their
own. Describing the I-they relationship in interpersonal terms, as an I-them relationship,
Roberts (1985) appropriately equated the I with an "imperialist" who unilaterally assigns
anyone of "them," a role which is accepted as a matter of course, thus rendering the latter as
a "wimp" or as the "door mat" of the I. Non-trivial machines might be bad means of
controlling something else but they may certainly be constructed to serve their masters.
Finally, in the I-they relationship others are referred to in plural and are seen as
members of classes outside of which they have no identity of their own. Empirical
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generalizations in the social sciences tend to assign people such class identities: there are
heavy and light TV viewers, there are females and males,there are truck drivers, teachers,
mothers, etc. Members of a class thus formed are assumed to share the same
characteristics, are seen as empirically indistinguishable within the class to which they
belong and their individual behavior is explained from knowledge of their class membership
(e.g., because someone is an A, he or she must be like all other A). People have no
freedom to negotiate their own classification. The logic derived from such class conception
of people, while descriptively parsimonious, is also the basis of ethnic prejudices, the chief
example of this is the social construction of an enemy as a class of at most non-trivial and
basically anonymous people of a certain kind.

I-you: Persons
While the I-it and the I-they relationships depict people as machines unlike the
observing I, an I-you relationship is at once more symmetrical and personal.
Etymologically, "person" comes from the Latin "persona" which denotes "an actor's mask."
Persons are aware of the difference between what they are and the role they are playing.
Their true identity is private, hidden from view, and often difficult to put into words, while
their overt identity is publicly displayed in talk and in action. Awareness of this difference
implies some choice, the ability to make some contribution to the definition of the person
someone is, which renders the behavior of persons somewhat unpredictable from the
outside.
Interestingly, the etymologically related concept of personality, the stable character
of a person, denies such choices by explaining people in terms of their internal structure,
history, or make-up. The convenience of describing people in terms of personality types
reduces them to non-trivial machines of a certain kind and adds nothing to the concept of a
person. A similar reduction takes place when a person is considered "one of them," the
member of a class whose common attributes account for who he or she is.
In contrast to the I-they relationship, persons are granted their own ideas about
themselves and about others, may develop them interactively with one another, and are
thereby thought to create or at least help shaping the social world they live in. Persons, in
the sense of the mask people are wearing, always co-evolve with other persons in situations
that receive their specificity through this very interactive process. There need not be a
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cause. Persons are both the product of negotiations and the frame through which mutually
meaningful communications are exchanged. Without interaction, persons cannot be
experienced (e.g., a prehistoric mask on someone's living room wall reduces to a mere
decorative object or a conversation piece void of its original interactional meaning). It
would follow that persons are neither analytically determinable through observation from the
outside nor synthetically determinable by construction from available parts. To understand
oneself and other people as persons requires participation, involvement in a joint process of
becoming, admitting to mutual influence, and respecting possibly divergent interests
governing that interaction. In this sense, persons are neither analytically nor synthically but

interactively determinable.
The symmetry implied in the I-you relationship lies in that the I of one person
corresponds to the you of the other. Each person is the other's other and each person
evaluates the other by how well it conforms to the role assigned to it. Should
disconforrnities be experienced, each person has the option of either changing its own
construction of the you, forcing the other into compliance or modifying its own I in
compliance with the other's demands. Thus each person's you responds to the constraining
efforts by the other's I and the constructive efforts by the own I. Graphically:

.....
/

constructing
.

(
I

\

')

I

you

you

)

constraining

,{
you you

\

I

'l
I

)

responding

In each construction, the person I and the person you are complementary. A friend
does not exist without another friend. Actors and audiences complement each other. There
is no buyer without a seller, and on the behavioral level, jokes require that someone tells one
and someone else laughs about it. The symmetry refers to the structure of the I-you
relationship; the complementarity to the particular realization that preserves that structure.
Thus, while persons respect each other's interest, values and competencies, particularly
including the ability to construct their own worlds containing the other, this means neither
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that persons are equal nor that they share the same world. Master-slave relationships are not
excluded here and a "real you" may never be knowable to any I.
It is important to emphasize that the construction of persons takes place in
specialized public domains including interpersonal encounters. Therapists and their patients
interact in the context of a therapeutic session to which certain rules apply that are claimed to
be understood by those involved. Husbands and wives interact in the context of a family
and know each other in this context. The kind of interaction that takes place in one context,
the kind of complementarity between persons that constitute this context is not easily if at all
extendable to other situations. E.g. it is said that friendship and business do not mix well.
Similarly, bribery is the extension of a practice that is acceptable in one domain into one
which it is not. Sometimes the same people meet in different domains and experience each
other in multiple roles, but because of their awareness of the role they are playing and
because of the public nature of their personal being, the true self can never enter these
constructions. Therefore, the I-you relationship does not involve whole human beings and
refers to specialized, compartmentalized, contextualized and socially negotiated worlds. The
work of Goffman (1959) exemplifies this compartmentalized construction of people as
persons. The work of Laing (1967) exemplifies the structural symmetries of these
constructions.
Unable to determine what person someone is by observation alone, social scientists
must inquire into their nature by interaction and cannot help but shape the very person they
wish to know about and may become shaped in the process as well. Both are engaged in a
mutual process of individual reality construction. Even though therapists tend to assume the
safe and superior expert role vis-a-vis their clients (after all it is the former who is paid by
the latter) good therapists often learn as much from their patients as patients learn from their
therapists (witness the papers therapists give to their professional societies quoting their
patients as authoritative sources of evidence). Participatory research comes closest to
granting people the status of persons by recognizing that the very people who are the target
of an inquiry are also the best experts about themselves and have not only an interest in the
outcome of the research but would not participate in the process unless they see some
benefit in this participation, e.g. increasing collective self-awareness, raising the level of
community competence, self-organization for action (Friere, 1974 ),
Good participatory researchers transform what those who send them as experts to a
community may have conceptualized as an I-they relationship into I-you relationships of
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mutual respect for divergent interests and knowledge within a specialized domain of public
interaction.
In I-you relationships, the I and the you become dependent on each other but only
within the domain in which a necessary complementarity has evolved. This dependency is
as much a property of either person's I-you construction as it is manifest in the interaction
between them and the mutual constraints on their freedom of choices. However, such
constraints may not be all-embracing, leaving a change of domains undefined or open and
irrelevant to a particular relationship. Thus, the fact that someone is accepted as a celebrity
in one context implies nothing about how he or she relates to a spouse. Public distinctions
between on-duty and off-duty, between work and leisure and between the different roles
persons may successively assume are witness to the freedom that is appreciated outside the
dependencies in a particular I-you relationship. Without this freedom an I-you relationship
cannot be realized.

I-thou: Human Individuals
To begin with a footnote: the original 1937 translation of Buber's "Ich and Du" (see
Horwitz, 1978) and many subsequent users of these conceptions, including Roberts (1985),
do not distinguish between I-you and I-thou. Only the second translation into English by
Kaufmann ( 1970) responds to the accumulated misgivings regarding the translation of
Buber's use of the German "du." However, this translation does not offer a formal
distinction either and I am therefore taking full responsibility for the one offered here.
Just as in the I-you relationship, I and thou denotes a pair of constructions of people
characterized by structural symmetry, mutual respect for each other's competence in creating
a world of their own constitutively including the other therein. But unlike in the I-you
relationship, people wear no masks and the distinction between a "true self" and the role
they might be playing has no place in it. In the I-thou relationship, people are self-

constituting whole individuals. Actually, etymologically, "individual" comes from
"indivisible" and the adjective "whole" would be redundant were it not for the casual use of
the term "individual" as referring to human beings in the generic sense. In the I-thou
relationship people are trne to themselves or authentic (Roberts, 1985) (as opposed to true to
particular situations that call for distinct roles to play).
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The model case of the I-thou relationship is love--not limited to romantic love, the
feeling of one-ness with someone of the opposite sex, but also including brotherly love, the
feeling of deep empathy for other fellow human beings, and spiritual love including the love
of God (Buber's eternal you), the feeling of being part of and serving higher purposes. Ithou is a relationship in which each individual faces not only his or her own self but also
honors others for what they are in their own terms.
The wholeness implied in I-thou relationships, the absence of distinctions between
what someone is and the impression he or she gives to others also prevents ulterior motives
and instrumental dependencies from entering this relationship. In fact, when someone
reflects on what benefit might result from his or her participation or what purposes this
relationship might be serving for either individual, the relationship can no longer remain an
I-thou but becomes an I-you relationship in which such reflections are common and the
object of negotiations. Conversely, conflicts of conscience, for example, between the
demands made by a person's role and the ethical principles he or she might be standing for
as an individual, signal the desire to transcend what then appears as a wrong distinction
between the self and its role. In an I-thou relationship, neither individual can serve the
other's purpose, neither can take advantage of or dominate the other. I-thou relationships
are incompatible with instrumentality, they are their own ends.
The absence of control notions from an I-thou relationship reveals the radical

autonomy of individual world constructions. When an I claims the autonomy of
constructing its own world and invents another individual whom it grants the same
autonomy, then neither can remain in the center of their own autonomy. [See the principle
of relativity which rejects any hypothesis that holds for two separate instances but not for
both together (Foerster, 1981)]. Autonomy is thus not merely claimed by I and appreciated
in its thou, it is recursively embedded in each individual's world constn1ction. Whereas in
the I-you relationship, the I and the you negotiate their respective freedom and their worlds
become dependent along the dimensions of their respective complementarities, in the I-thou
relationship, I's autonomy is predicated on the autonomy of thou and each world is
supported by the other's freedom.
An epistemological paradox lies in how I might come to know (determine the nature
of) thou without instrumental intents, without the desire to shape the other's identity in
relation to I's, without intruding in that other's autonomous world. The resolution lies in
the recursive nature of I-thou world constructions. Granting thou the same autonomy I
enjoy calls first for claiming that autonomy for the self, then for constructing a thou
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empowered with that same autonomy, which in turn demands a revision of the autonomy
claimed for the self, etc. Understanding thou then is a continuous process of becoming coautonomons, making space available for the other, and thereby simultaneously liberating
oneself and freeing the other from mutual impositions. Understanding thou is a process of

continuous mutual emancipation. Ultimately the distinction between I and thou transcends
into a joint process of creating autonomous realities, into co-ontogenous selves.
I-thou relationships are far from mystical or unreal although they can easily escape
both, recognition by people inexperienced with them and operationalizations in traditional
social science discourses. To test this contention Roberts (1985) collected empirical data
that supported the predictive power of the distinction between I-thou and herI-them
relationships. Moreover, she found significant connections between the ability of people to
recognize the authenticity of romantic love on the one hand and their past personal
experiences (satisfaction/disappointment) with such relationships on the other.
My concern is not interpersonal, however, and romantic love is only one example of
an I-thou relationship. I will instead comment on the involvement of scientific inquiry in all
four of these constructions.

Comparisons
Table 1 summarizes the principle features of the four I-other relationships elucidated above.
Table 1 about here
In comparing these, the kind of constructions of people implied in these relationships turn
out to be logically derivable from each other and ultimately from the construction of human
individuals in the I-thou relationship. Thus, human individuals in the I-thou relationship are
considered here the prototypical case of this typology.
So, as soon as some I, a lover, a social scientist or any thou for that matter,
introduces a distinction between the self and how this self is to appear to someone else, as
soon as individual behavior is viewed instrumentally (including as successful or in error),
then the I is compelled into a control mode of interaction, can no longer construct the other
as a thou within its own autonomy, but as instrumentally supportive or constraining I's

Table

1

A Typology of I-Other Relationships

The other's

I-thou:
Human individuals

I-you:
Persons

I-they:
Non-trivial Machines

I-it:
Trivial Machines

Determinability: Not applicable

Interactively
detenniuable by
participation

Synthetically
detennioable by
model construction

Analytically
detennioable by
observation

Structure:

Thou's recursive
construction includes
I as autonomous
whole, structurally
similar to I's

You's recursive
construction includes a
structurnlly symmetrical
I aod evolves into a
complementary
I-you relationship

Structurally detennined
system (logic,
rationality, values,
rules, laws, etc.)
governs their behavior
in response to I

Mathematical
functions (codes)
account for its
responses to I

Identity:

Chosen in respect for
the other's
authenticity of being

Negotiated between
I aod you within a
specialized domaio of
iostrumental
Interdependence

Assigned according
to properties shared
among class members

Arbitrarily assigned

Purpose:

No purpose outside of
being io that relation
relationship

A mutually beneficial
internction preserving
self-interest
reciprocally

A replacable
service to I

A meaos of control
for I

Freedom:

Autonomy (predicated
Choices exhaust
on other's independence) freedom within a
is mutually constitutive domain of
internction. Residue
escapes mutual control

None.
Pseudo-freedom
arises in ignoraoce
of structural
determinacy

None

Functional

Technological

Kind of society
supported:
Emaocipatory

Political
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intentions. Drawing such a distinction thus retards what may have been an I-thou
relationship to begin with to an I-you relationship.
Similarly, as soon as the I in an I-you relationship tries to remove itself from the
interactive participation in the complementary construction of personal worlds by attempting
to explain the behavior of others from a position of a detached observer, to establish the
kind of people they objectively are (which denies the the ability to negotiate their own
identity with I), or to predict their behavior from the internal make-up a class of people are
presumed to share, what may have been a structurally symmetrical I-you relationship now
retards to a structurally a-symmetrical I-they relationship. In this a-symmetry, the I usurps
the others' competence of constructing their own worlds. Even though these others may
claim to make choices of their own, by explaining them in terms of stable values, rational
principles, etc., the I must then regard them as pseudo-choices. People thereby lose their
status as persons and become non-trivial machines of a certain kind.
Finally, as the soon as I seeks to predict the behavior of others from observables
alone, which denies them a life of their own, the historically determined but analytically
unpredictable I-they relationship retards to an I-it relationship in which people become trivial
machines, channels of communication, or codes.
The fourrelationships are thus ordered as in Table 1.
Based on this typology, I now offer brief accounts of how methods of social inquiry
differentially contribute to the constructions of people and how social science knowledge
indepted to these methods in turn facilitates if not creates the social use of human beings
implied in such constructions. The following hopes to reveal the methodological blind spots
of social inquiry.

Methodological Limits and Social Consequences
Constructing people as trivial machines is the trade mark of behaviorism, of course.
This approach denies the need for theory and demands that scientific accounts be restricted
to observable behaviors (exclusive of reported perceptions, feelings, experiences, and
vicarious phenomena) and take the form of functions (associations, correlations, causes,
etc.). Although the label "behaviorist" has lately fallen in disrepute, the most widely used
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data languages (e.g., distinguishing dependent and independent variables, causes and
consequences), the most easily available analytical techniques (e.g. regression equations,
factor analyses, Shannon's early approach to information theory [see Krippendotff, 1986]),
coupled with predictive intents produce such constructions most naturally.
Constructing people as trivial machines structurally equates them with technical
devices and the social use of this kind of knowledge renders people as instrumental
components of a technologically comprehended society. Although behavioral scientists like
to see themselves as objective and removed from the consequences of their "findings,"
realizing that knowledge never is value-free, they must be held responsible for creating or at
least amplifying the trivial and obedient nature of the people they claim to describe and for
delivering them as objects of instrumental control to those who gain from using this
knowledge in advertising, therapy, management, government and industry.
Excepting strict behaviorist approaches to research, the practice of constructing
people as non-trivial machines reigns supreme in much of the social sciences. It is a
necessary consequence of the paradigmatic commitment to explaining data after they have
been collected (as opposed to negotiating their meaning while they are being generated),

admitting theoretical constructs and recursive models of unobservables into these
explanations, provided that they render scientific findings predictable of observable
phenomena, and to generalize research findings in terms of categories specifically including
people. Non-trivial machine constructions are consistent with the positivistic program
which is committed to a covering-law model of scientific explanation (i.e., the position of
laws and hypothetical variables, however derived, that ultimately explain scientific
observations). It is common to economic modeling where assumptions of profit motives
and rational behavior help explain aggregate behavior. It is found in structuralism and in
Marxism to the extent they are concerned not with the experiences of people but with
uncovering the "deep strncture" of their social practice, thought to underly directly
observable phenomena or with material conditions regardless of whether the people
involved are aware about them or not.
The construction of people as non-trivial machines recently received a new impetus
in the social use of computers for simulation of human behavior on the"hard" side and in the
increasingly popular invocation of computer metaphors for describing human cognition on
the "soft" side. Computers are the prototype of synthetically deterministic and analytically
unpredictable machines that underly I-they constructions. Artificial intelligence obviously is
a "hard" reification of the machine metaphors of human cognition, but the popular use of
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terms like "memory", "retrieval", "information processing", "encoding-decoding,"
"computing" including the notion of a "psycho-logic" shows how much the conception of
non-trivial machines is accepted in everyday discourse. It is safe to say that the data-based
social sciences, from economics to sociology, including much of contemporary linguistics
and communication research is methodologically confined to the construction of people from
the detached position as an outsider and therefore as non-trivial machines at best.
People known in terms of non-trivial machines are denied the freedom of
constructing others and themselves, regardless of their own claims, and are therefore
considered unable to initiate changes or behave outside their strict structural confinements.
People of this construction may be taught many tasks but are easily replacable by other
members of their class. The social use of knowledge in terms of I-they relationships fits
people into the prepared categories of a functionally comprehended society. In such a
society individuals do not matter except for their readiness to serve social functions. The
social reality into which people are fitted is preconstructed and changes therein are either
denied, fought (because they could destroy the classificatory basis of functional knowledge)
or relegated to objective laws outside of anyone's control.
The functional conception of a stable society often is so persuasive that social
scientists may develop non-trivial machine notions for themselves as well, denying that they
are creatively engaged in reality constructions by claiming to merely observe and describe
what objectively exists (Krippendorff, in press), claiming at best to use their carefully
acquired and institutionally approved skills. In the domain of interpersonal relations,
Roberts (1985) presents the case that people of certain self-constructions do not realize their

own potential and cannot see beyond their self-imposed horizons. In the social sciences, it
is the commitment to the dominant paradigm that tends to prevent researchers from looking
beyond the demands made by a rational-functional society (e.g. Talcot Parsons'
construction) which they have learned to appreciate and snpport without understanding their
own constitutive contributions.
The construction of persons in scientific inquiries (not to be confused with
describing from the outside how subjects become socialized or acculturated) requires that
social scientists engage in I-you relationships and accept that the understanding gained in
such interactions is jointly created, complementary and specific to a situation. Data are
obtained interactively and their meanings are negotiated while being generated. In contrast,
the dominant paradigm for social research has banned this kind of interaction for fear of
introducing biases and of distorting otherwise "uncontaminated" facts.
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The realization that researchers actually do participate in the construction of the very
realities they aim to describe slowly opens the door to other approaches. One is

participatory research which grants members of the community studied the expertise to
inquire about their own affairs. A second is the knowledge in action approach to research
(Argyris, 1970; Schon, 1983) in which the aquisition of knowledge and active intervention
go hand in glove without assigning priorities to either. A third is constructionism in
psychology (e.g. Gergen and Davis, 1985), a broad and emerging approach with emphasis
on the communal basis of knowledge and the interactive construction even of phenomena
previously attributed to biological and hence thought to be involuntary processes, like
emotions. A forth is radical constructivism, a philosophical school that traces its history to
Giambattista Vico, currently represented by von Glasersfeld (1984). Much of these
approaches echo parallel developments in anthropology that focus on culture as a coinvention by both, the anthropologists and the community in interaction (Wagner, 1975).
The interactive construction of persons liberates people from being forced into
socially prepared categories and demands of social scientists to reflect on their
responsibilities as participants in these constructions. It is ushering a major revolution in the
epistemology of social inquiry whose end still needs to be envisioned. It provides new
foundations for several schools in psycho-therapy and has stimulated social movements
(e.g. EST, The Forum) which focus on there construction of individual experiences as a
way of overcoming what might appear to be psycho-pathologies but turn out to be social in
nature. Finally, it offers an attractive opportunity for minorities and women to be not
merely frustrated by their existing oppression but to develop a systematic understanding of
themselves as participants in the social construction that underlies this inequity and may thus
show participatory ways out of it. The construction of persons in scientific inquiries
licenses creative participation and demands social responsibility for all.
The absence of instrumentality and mutually constraining influences in I-thou
relationships make the conventional notion of understanding one another as whole

individuals difficult to realize scientifically. It might appear that I-thou relationships are
rationally impenetrable--a position very much supported in Buddhist teachings in which
individuals aim to be whole and one with the universe, without fears of others or of nature,
demanding nothing but to remain in a continuous process of co-becoming. Although love in
its various manifestations is experiential and hence real, to will it creates a paradox, to teach
it makes it incomprehendable, and to operationalize it makes it vanish. Nevertheless, people
can acquire the cognitive skills to practice such relationships and there is no reason to
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suppose that scientific inquiries could not provide the conditions for such basically selfdirected processes to take off.
In conclusion, it seems clear that social scientists are well equipped to engage in I-it
relationships. The methods are simple and straight forward in application but the social
implications are, I believe, unconscionable. Social scientists feel particularly comfortable in
I-they relationships in which they can maintain their superior status as the sole creators of a
scientific world of a multitude of non-trivial machines. There are a few rebellious scholars
who try to overcome the paradigmatic obstacles against entering into I-you relationships
with people and hope to thereby pave the way for granting persons the competence to coconstruct their own realities by interacting with each other, including with the scientist.
I am far from suggesting that social scientists undiscriminately engage in I-thou
relationships with those they wish to understand. The very interest in observing,
generalizing and publically accounting for their interaction with them already defies this
relationship. But, if social scientist have any self-reflexive competence above the ordinary,
their constructions should create at least the epistemological conditions for I-thou
relationships to arise and enable a true emancipation of and by fellow human beings. An
expansion of our scientific horizon that includes self-reflexive human constructions of
human beings could be the most noble gift from and to our own mind.

This paper was presented at the International Communication Association Conference
on "Connections," Chicago, May 21-26, 1986.
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